T he shareholders of a company entrust the daily management of the company to a group of experts, namely directors. But as the owners of a company, shareholders maintain certain means of influence over the management of the company in order to protect the value of their shares and their right to receive dividends. Normally their influence is exercised through the expression of opinions and the casting of votes at shareholders' general meetings. However, there are other means of influence and one of them is the derivative action. It is an action against directors brought by a shareholder on behalf of the company. Where a company has incurred damage due to a breach of duty by a director, the company is entitled to take an action against the director, but is usually reluctant to do so. The derivative action enables shareholders to enforce directors' liability on behalf of the company. This article examines some aspects of its recent operation in Japan.
REFORM OF THE DERIVATIVE ACTION
In Japan the derivative action was relatively unused until recently.
The obvious disincentive for shareholders to bring a derivative action is meagre personal reward for winning the action, since any recovery awarded accrues to the company, not to the plaintiff-shareholder. The shareholder benefits only indirectly through the increase in dividend or in the value of his shares, which can be negligible.
One of the other disincentives, until recently, was expensive filing fees that a plaintiff might have to pay to initiate a derivative action. Until recently the filing fees were a certain proportion of the amount claimed from the directors. In derivative actions this amount can be enormous.
However, in the aftermath of a series of corporate scandals that came to light with the collapse of the bubble economy, steps were taken in 1993 to strengthen the shareholders' grip on management by making the derivative action more available. As one of the main features of the reform, the filing fees were set at 8,200 yen (approximately £40), regardless of the contested amount (art. 267(4) of the Commercial Code; art. 4(2) of the Civil Procedure Expenses Act).
EFFECT OF THE REFORM
The 1993 reform resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of derivative actions. The size of actions has also grown since the amount of filing fees no longer goes up with the amount claimed. Consequently, the derivative action has now become a potent deterrent to managerial misconduct.
On the flip side, concern is growing over abusive derivative actions. Corporate racketeers called sokaiya and other unscrupulous shareholders may use the derivative action to put pressure on directors with a view to extorting money or to resolving a personal dispute with the company in their favour. Regardless of the strength of their claim, the directors may find it cheaper to yield to their demand than to fight through the action (see Amicus Curias, Issue 6, p. 7).
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ABUSE
A shareholder wishing to bring a derivative action must first demand that the company initiates an action against the directors and must allow the company 30 days to decide whether to accede to or reject the demand (art. 267 (2) These requirements may be effective in curbing frivolous actions. However, thev will have a limited effect in deterring
those shareholders who are determined to abuse the derivative action. A shareholder can bring a derivative action even if they bought a share after discovering an assailable director's conduct.
All they have to do is wait six months after buying a share, make a demand and wait a further 30 days. The decision of the company not to bring an action, however well-reasoned, cannot stop the shareholder starting an action. (To avoid bias in favour of the targeted directors, it is not directors but auditors who are given power to decide whether the company should accede to the shareholder's demand: art. 275 4 of the Commercial Code.)
FAME
In one case, a derivitave action was brought in order that the plaintiff might become famous and thus able to claim higher tees as an attorney
DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AS AN ABUSE OF RIGHT
The intended purpose of conferring on shareholders the right to pursue a derivative action is to obtain recovery of damages for the company. If a shareholder brings a derivative action for other purposes, e.g. to cause harm to the directors, it may be dismissed as an abuse of right (e.g. Nagasaki District Court, 19
February 1991).
However, since a plaintiff-shareholder's personal gain from winning a derivative action can be minimal, it is not always possible to expect shareholders to bring a derivative action genuinely for the purpose of obtaining recovery for the company. If the claim is well founded, the action should not be dismissed too easily just because the plaintiff has an unintended purpose. Thus in one case, the plaintiff brought the derivative action in order to become famous, so that he would be able to 
ORDER FOR THE PROVISION OF SECURITY
When a derivative action is initiated, on the fulfilment of certain requirements the court may order the plaintiff to provide security (art. 267(5) of the Commercial Code).
Dual purpose of the order
The primary purpose of orders for the provision of security is to secure the recovery of damages for a wrongful action. If a plaintiff loses a derivative action, he or she may have to pay damages to the defendant if the court determines that he or she knew or did not know in negligence that the claim lacked legal The secondary purpose of orders for the provision of security is to deter abusive actions. Orders are often made to attain both purposes. The primary purpose alone cannot explain why the courts have often ordered a prohibitive amount of security, leaving the plaintiff with no choice but to give up the action.
Since the courts have been displaying a strong tendency to grant motion for security, some commentators are warning that the availability of the derivative action may be unduly restricted by the increase in the costs of litigation, a result contrary to the intention of the 1993 reform to lower the filing fees.
Requirements for issuing the order
The court may order the provision of security upon prima facie showing by the defendant that the derivative action has been brought in 'bad faith' (art. 267 (6) and 106(2) It is to be noted that the first of these two tests mirrors the requirements for obtaining damages for a wrongful action. A shareholder, in initiating a derivative action, is sometimes not totally sure that the defendant-directors are liable, especially where the determination of their liability is subject to the business judgment rule. In such cases the plaintiff does not know that the claim lacks legal grounds. But the defendant may still be able to show by prima facie evidence that the plaintiff is negligent in not knowing that the claim lacks legal grounds. 
